Introduction
What began as a secular revolt against the autocratic regime of Bashar al-Assad, the conflict in Syria has now turned into bloodshed. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights recently stated that the death toll in Syria's civil war has risen to at least 125,835, but the real figure is probably higher. 1 It is reported that around 50,000 fighters loyal to Assad and around 27,000 rebel fighters have been killed in the war. 2 Among the dead on the side of the rebels are 6,000 foreign fighters or unknown combatants, coming from different countries, including Balkan states. While the exact number of fighters coming from the Balkans remains unknown, it is assumed that there are at least few hundred of them currently fighting in Syria. 3 As Syria's civil war develops into a complex war with a clear sectarian dimension, an increasing number of Sunni Balkan militants 4 are being mobilized and joining Syria's rebel cause, specifically the Islamic radical groups linked to al-Qaeda. This reality begs at least four important questions, which critically motivate this paper. Why are these Balkan militants joining Syria's rebel cause? How are they being mobilized? How is this reality, the mobilization of Balkan militants, affecting the interreligious and inter-state relations in the region? In light of Syria's civil war, can these developments have any impact on the future of the Balkans?
Recently, a number of articles and policy-oriented reports have come out that focus on the civil war in Syria, examine the struggle for power in the 1 Erika Solomon, "Syria Death Toll Hits Nearly 126,000: Monitoring Groups, " Reuters, 02 December 2013, www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/02/us-syria-crisis-toll-idUSBRE9B10-ES20131202 (accessed on 22 January 2014) 2 Ibid 3 Vesna Peric Zimonjic, "Balkans Feed the Syria Battle," Inter Press Service, 02 August 2013, www.ipsnews.net/2013/08/balkans-feed-the-syria-battle/ (accessed on 22 January 2014) 4 The term militant is used to describe a radical person who believes in and advocates complete political and social reform to be conducted in a combative and aggressive way. Sunni Balkan militants are a relative small number of Sunni Balkan Muslims who are joining Syria's rebel cause. These militants are being mobilized in individual basis and generally come from discriminated minority groups, such as Gypsies, and from undeveloped poor-hit areas where the state has made minimal or no investment whatsoever, such as in the case of Macedonia and Serbia. 
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country, look at the regional rivalry context, and speculate on the options of military international intervention against Assad's regime. 5 These works competently assess the intensified sectarian violence in Syria and the longterm implications for the broader Middle East region, but they fall short of considering the nexus between the Balkans and Syria's civil war. Specifically, the questions of why and how are Balkan militants mobilized and the possible impact this mobilization might have on the region and its future, merit a closer attention by both scholars and policy makers alike. In light of Syria's civil war, what are the realities and challenges confronting the Balkans? This is especially important given that the region has been alleged of fostering radical Islam and considerably feeding Syria's battlegrounds. Placing the Balkans on the spotlight, this paper aims to fill this intellectual gap by offering an explanation for why and how Balkan militants are joining Syria's rebel cause and explore if these developments can have any substantial affect on the future of the Balkans. 6 Drawing upon various reliable sources, such as security reports, briefings, media reports, secondary sources, and personal observations, the collected evidence will demonstrate that Balkan militants are joining Syria's rebel cause because foreign Islamic radical groups (FIRGs), 7 
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been operating in the region since the early 1990s, have successfully indoctrinated them. Also, it will be shown that the Islamic ideological networks and the Islamic infrastructural mechanisms 8 that were arranged and built by FIRGs have significantly facilitated the mobilization process of Balkan militants to Syria, and are understood to be essential in leading and controlling this process. The question of how Balkan militants are mobilized will be answered using the first two stages of the four-stages model, which I shall disclose in following pages. In the first stage, it is argued that the political and socio-economic vulnerability in the Balkans, during the wars of Yugoslav disintegration, opened a "window of opportunity" for FIRGs to expand their influence and activities deep in local Muslim communities. In the second stage, taking advantage of this opportunity, FIRGs effectively established their presence in the area and rather quickly infiltrated the minds and hearts of Balkan militants, especially of those living in rural and poor-hit area. Stages three and four of the model will provide a framework to explore how is the reality of mobilization of Balkan militants affecting inter-religious and inter-state relations in the region. Moreover, these stages will lay the ground for exploring if these developments have any impact on the future of the Balkans, in light of Syria's civil war. Before I address the questions motivating this paper and disclose the four-stages model, some conceptual clarifications are in order. To place the broader argument into a firmer context the elucidation of terms Islam, civil war, and sectarianism are essential. For our purposes here, the concept of Islam is important for at least three important reasons. First, the Balkans is home to Muslim communities for more than six centuries and there are currently more than 8 million adherents of Islam in the region who comprise majority in Albania, Bosnia, and Kosovo, very large minority in 
Civil War, Islam, Sectarianism
We often tend to think of civil wars as binary conflicts, understanding them through some overarching issue such as ethnicity, race, or religion. However, in practice, civil wars are much more complex, often comprising a combination of actors, actions, and identities. Civil wars start as uniform "armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of hostilities," 11 but they do have a tendency to develop increasingly intricate and eventually spread outside sovereign borders. In such case the master cleavage becomes hard to define, and the immersion of external actors is practically inevitable. The war in Syria has taken such a turn and is no longer merely a power struggle between Assad and his opponents. The The activation of sectarian identity, by Assad, in the early months of the civil war, not only caused more deaths but it prompted the opposition to take similar measures. Different groups within the opposition began to activate their specific identities, which helped transform the war from a struggle between the two religious denominations (Sunni and Shia) to a complex war positioning different religious, regional, and tribal groups against one another. Thus, sectarianism is not a religion, rather a form of group belonging that in times of conflict and war calls for hatred and killing members of the other groups. This idea of group belonging, or sectarianism, has attested a powerful force that has pulled into the war a number of external actors, including Sunni Balkan militants who are fighting on the side of Sunni radical groups. 
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In the following pages, I turn my full attention to the realities and challenges confronting the Balkans. The mobilization of Balkan militants is perceived as both a reality and a challenge that needs to be addressed objectively. Questions such as, why Balkan militants are joining Syria's rebel cause, how are Balkan militants being mobilized, and who are the main actors in the process, are all at the center of what follows. Of great interest are also the questions dealing with the affects of the mobilization of militants on the region's inter-religious and inter-state relations. The reintegration process of the Balkan militants, and the challenges they may transmit to the region are also carefully considered. What do these challenges hold for the Balkans and its future? Only by examining such quandaries objectively can we arrive at an explanation that is likely to be useful to scholars and valuable to policy-makers who are dealing with the Balkans.
Dreaming the "Land of Jihad"
Why are Balkan militants joining Syria's rebel cause? I argue that radical religious indoctrination is the main causal factor that explains this reality. Balkan militants are joining Syria's rebel cause because FIRGs have successfully indoctrinated them. The militants have been imbued with a new set of attitudes and beliefs of a specific religious radical ideology, which now creates a sense of obligation for each of them to go aid their "Islamic brethren" emerge victorious and establish an Islamic state in which the principal basis of government is Sharia (Islamic religious law). 17 Indoctrinated in this way, Balkan militants are now placed into a mystical and conceptual mindset, which guides them toward dreaming the land of jihad.
By no means is this indoctrination process simple and easy to explain. However, it is important that we attempt to reduce its complexity and try to grasp the process and its central players. One good way to make sense of it is by thinking about it as a process which involves repetition of the Islamic radical doctrine over and over until the target becomes "immunized" against any other belief or ideology. Once the target is 
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entirely immunized, he is willing to sacrifice everything in the name of Jihad and for the sake of Allah. In the case of Balkan militants, there is an impression that there is a higher purpose to die for -not for a nation, but for the love of Allah.
Two players are central to this indoctrination process: Islamic ideological networks and Islamic infrastructural mechanisms. While other factors might play a role in the process at large, ideological networks and infrastructural mechanisms play the key roles in controlling and guiding this process. Islamic ideological networks are basically the "governing bodies" of the process. These networks are usually led by a radical cleric who leads these loose and unstructured small groups and operates with three objectives in mind. First, these networks aim to create a source of "inner trust web," where only those who are part of the network are to be trusted. Second, they tend to emphasize the "facts" about the "true" religion, and teach to reject all external alternatives. Finally, they seek to create a narrow cynical mentality in those being indoctrinated. These three objectives have very much shaped the whole indoctrination process; however, the process would have not been as successful if infrastructural mechanisms were not in place. Mosques, religious schools, and other religious venues played an important role in the process of indoctrination. Since the early 1990s, FIRGs have built or helped built thousands of mosques and religious sites in the region, precisely with this goal in mind. Utilizing these infrastructural mechanisms, FIRGs kept Balkan militants totally occupied with religious prayers, meetings, get-togethers, and other activities, just so that they are kept completely separate from other Balkan Muslims until they are totally detached both ideologically and emotionally from the masses, in some cases even from their immediate families.
In sum, this indoctrination process has not only enabled the mobilization of Balkan militants to Syria but it has also inculcated the convictions that there is nothing more enjoyable than conducting Jihad, set foot on the land of al-Sham (the Levant) and the land of Jihad for the sake of Allah, give victory to the oppressed Muslims, and die for the love of Allah. 18 This reality is affecting not only the relations between moderate Muslim majority and unincorporated Islamist minority in the Balkans, but _____________________________ Iliria International Review -2014/1 © Felix-Verlag, Holzkirchen, Germany and Iliria College, Pristina, Kosovo 367 also the inter-religious and inter-state relations in the region. The reintegration process of Balkan militants (upon their return) is likely to deteriorate these relations further. How will these militants cope with their return? Will they seek to challenge the pluralistic and democratic order of the region? More broadly, what kinds of challenges will they bring to the Balkans and how will these challenges impact the future of the region? Before we explore these questions it seems logical that we first take a look at the process of mobilization of Balkan militants to Syria.
From the Balkans to the Battlegrounds
This paper offers a modest four-stage model that explains the process of mobilization of Balkan militants to Syria and provides the framework for exploring how the mobilization and re-integration process of militants might affect the stability and the future of the region. Stages one and two directly address the mobilization process, whereas stages three and four provide the context in which we can explore the affects of the mobilization on the inter-religious and inter-state relations in the region, and potential challenges that might emerge from the re-integration of militants into Balkan society. The model is illustrated below in figure 2.
In the first stage, I argue, the political and socio-economic vulnerability that had gripped the region, during the 1990s, opened a window of opportunity for FIRGs to expand their influence and activities deep in local Muslim communities. The collapse of Yugoslavia and the fall of Communism, which for nearly five decades succeeded in preserving coexistence among different religious and ethnic groups, turned out to be an important juncture that significantly shaped the fate of religious radicalism and inter-religious and inter-ethnic relations in the Balkans. Particularly the war in Bosnia was envisioned as a golden opportunity for FIRGs to penetrate deep in the Balkans. The Bosnian war, as soon as religion became the defining feature of it, attracted hundreds of foreign Islamic militants, mainly from Saudi Arabia and Iran, who joined the Muslim Bosnian forces. Several hundred of Islamic militants remained in Bosnia after the war came to a close, some marrying Muslim Bosnian women and others gaining citizenship through other means. Additionally, a number of "faith-based" Islamic groups were stationed in the country right after the war ended. Very soon these organizations were discovered to have had primarily an ideological rather than humanitarian agenda, and many of them close links to groups such as al-Qaeda. These FIRGs together with the remaining foreign Islamic militants played an important role not only during the course of planting the first seeds of the ideological networks and infrastructural mechanisms but also during the greater regional expansion of these networks. Soon after the Bosnian war ended, these groups rather quickly established themselves and their activities in other Balkan states, Albania, FYROM, Kosovo, and Serbia.
In the second stage, FIRGs fairly quickly expanded their activities and infiltrated the minds and hearts of Balkan militants, especially those found 20 Islamic communities in Kosovo and FYROM as well as the one in Bosnia might formally claim to be the sole investors in religious investments in their respective communities, but their links to FIRGs is hard to deny.
All of these investments together with weak internal structures in the Balkans smoothed the rise and expansion of Islamic radical groups in the region. Once the ideological networks and infrastructural mechanisms were set in place the conversion from moderate Muslim to incorporated Islamist and unincorporated Islamist, and in some instances directly to Jihadist became much easier. Economic incentives certainly played some role in the process of conversion, but the evidence emerging from Balkans and the battlegrounds confirms the claim that Balkan militants who are fighting and dying in Syria are doing so for the love of Allah. 
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The first two stages of the model, which I presented above, show not only the process through which the FIRGs established their presence in the Balkans but also the process of how Balkan militants are being mobilized to Syria. Religious radical indoctrination and the mobilization of militants to Syria (which is an outcome of the former) are realities that are affecting the region at both domestic level and international level. The last two stages of the model, which I shall explore in what follows, are rather hypothetical given that developments in the region (those related to Syria's civil war) are currently unfolding.
Back to the "Sacred" Balkans?
The reality that Balkan militants are joining Syria's rebel cause, specifically the Sunni Islamic radical groups linked to al-Qaeda is concerning for the region. While there is a consensus among experts that the Balkans is not a key region harboring or funding Islamic radical groups or their activities, the reality is that the region's continuing problems continue to leave the Balkans vulnerable. 22 One such problem is the mobilization of Balkan militants and their expected return from Syria's civil war. Both of these matters will be explored using stages three and four of the model. More precisely, in stage three I will look at how this reality of Balkan militants joining Syria's civil war is affecting the region at both domestic and international levels. In stage four I explore how are militants likely to cope with their return to the Balkans. Will they merely seek reintegration into moderate Muslims societies or will they challenge the pluralistic and democratic order. And more broadly, what kinds of challenges they are able and likely to bring to the region.
At the domestic level, the reality of Balkan militants joining Sunni Islamic radical groups in Syria is generating not only inter-religious but 
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also intra-religious tensions within the Balkan Muslim community. Like never before, unincorporated Islamists (supporters of the militants) are situating themselves against the state and the moderate Muslim majority, and have begun to question the fundamental aspects of the current social and political order in the Balkans. 23 The wearing of hijab in public schools, building of new mosques in the city centers, and the role of Islam in the social and political life are some of the hot issues that define the current intra-religious tensions and that have sparked serious debates over the identity and direction of the Balkan countries. 
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Bosniak national identity, and more recently the Islamic Community in Bosnia has begun to play a more active role in both political and socioeconomic spheres because of the dysfunctional government in Bosnia, the renewed Croat and Serb challenges to the state's territorial integrity, and the governments inability to solve numerous social and economic issues. This reality has irritated Serbs and Croats to a great extent, and the mobilization of Bosnian militants to Syria only adds more fuel to the fire, seriously upsetting the relations between Bosnian Muslims, Catholics, and Orthodox. In FYROM, the most ethnically heterogeneous and politically unstable country in the Balkans, 27 the mobilization of Islamic militants to Syria is having a significant affect on its multi-ethnic and multiconfessional society. The presence of radical Islam symbols, such as flags, during a recent Albanian protest 28 is suggestive that the long ethnic struggle between Albanian Muslims and Slav Orthodox in FYROM might have a radical religious dimension to it. Because FYROM's stability and its very existence very much rests on the goodwill of Albanian population there (who are almost entirely Muslim), the mobilization of militants and their anticipated return should be understood as a potential threat to the existence of this state. Lastly, in Kosovo, the Serb Orthodox minority has been very active in trying to depict the reality of Kosovo militants fighting in Syria not only as a challenge to Kosovo's history and Serb civilization there but also to their immediate security. The anger among Orthodox Serb rose even higher when the first Balkan Islamist political party, The Islamist Group Join (Bashkohu), was formed in Kosovo in 2013. 29 At the international level, the reality of Balkan militants joining Sunni Islamic groups in Syria is affecting the Balkan states in three important ways. First, the reality is being exploited by some Balkan states for their political and geostrategic advantage. For instance, "Serbian and Bosnian Serb politicians often make charges of Al Qaeda training camps in Bosnia and Kosovo in an effort to discredit Bosnians and Albanians." 30 
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terror training camps for Syrian rebels. 31 The lack of sufficient facts backing such accusations forces one to reject these allegations as true. Xhabir Hamiti, a Professor of Islamic Studies, rightly urged Kosovo and Albanian intellectuals not to fall into the trap of the enemies who are trying to weak the Albanian nation by trying to divide it along religious lines, as they have attempted before. 32 Second, this reality is affecting the region's European Union (EU) ambition. All of Balkan states under analysis have clearly expressed their desire to join the EU. However, this desire is currently facing a shocking resistance that comes from the heart of the EU. As Albania's recent experience demonstrates, Muslim identity of the country is the problem for extremist forces in the EU that see the Union as a special club for Christians only. 33 While the EU does not formally link the refusal of Albania's EU candidacy to country's Muslim identity, there is no question that the reality of Balkan militants joining Syria's radical groups has played a role in shaping the Dutch, Danish, German, French, and British veto for Albania's EU candidacy status. 34 The Muslim identity of Bosnia and Kosovo also seem to be conclusive issues when it comes to EU membership.
Third, the reality is also affecting each state's relationship with the United States, and the U.S. terms of engagement with the area. This is important not only because the U.S. is the world's superpower but also because of its commitment to fight any effort aimed at installing radical Islamism, especially in a part of Europe such as the Balkans. The attack on American embassy in Bosnia in 2010, by an Islamic radical from Novi Pazar, Serbia, is but one instance that confirms the vulnerability of the region and the reason why active American engagement (both at diplomatic and security levels) is crucial. However, American policy makers should be vigilant when drafting security policies for the Balkans. There have been numerous works that exaggerate the threat of radical Islam in the Balkans, depicting it as the greatest threat to the region and 36 and anti-Americanism, 37 than from the "imported" radical Islam.
As I have shown above, the reality that Balkan militants are joining radical groups in Syria is generating numerous challenges that are affecting the region in various ways. These challenges are both domestic and international, and they affect the political and socio-economic realms of the region. The return of Balkan militants could turn out problematic for the region and affect the future of the Balkans. The war in Syria is still unfolding but an assessment of potential challenges that Balkan militants might bring to the region will be of value to both scholars and policymakers dealing with the region.
The Future of the Balkans in Light of Syria's Civil War
A report published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs identifies four possible outcome scenarios for Syria's civil war: regime survival, implosion, full-blown civil war, and international military intervention. 38 These outcomes will be critical for Syrian people and Syria's neighbors, but virtually irrelevant for the Balkans. Whatever the outcome, the Balkans and Syria will move on in two different paths. The Balkan states will continue with their objective of EU integration, while the postcivil war Syria most likely will resemble the neighboring Iraq. Yet, the issue of Balkan militants who will return from Syria remains thought provoking. How are militants likely to cope with their return to the Balkans? Will they merely seek re-integration into moderate Muslims societies or are they likely to challenge the pluralistic and democratic order? And more broadly, what kinds of challenges are they likely to bring to the region? In this last _____________________________ Iliria International Review -2014/1 © Felix-Verlag, Holzkirchen, Germany and Iliria College, Pristina, Kosovo 377 utilize aspects of these models, with the appropriate adjustments. 41 Balkan Islam also has a high potential to serve as a bridge-builder not only between the Balkans and the Muslims world, but also between Europe and the Muslims world.
Conclusion
In 2013, assessing the security challenges facing the Balkans, Janusz Bugajski, a prominent Balkan policy analyst, identified the following as factors with direct impact on the security of the region: territorial disputes, administrative borders, and legitimacy of statehood. 42 For Bugajski, political and legal disputes among Balkan states are far greater threats to the security of the region than the "imported" idea of radical Islam. Bugajski's conclusions are in agreement with the findings of this paper. While FIRGs, their teachings, and radical Islam in the Balkans are certainly challenges that deserve to be kept in check, they are far from being the greatest threat to the security and stability of the region, let alone to Europe and the West.
In summary, I have shown that Balkan militants are joining Syria's rebel cause because FIRGs, which have been operating in the region since the start of the Bosnian war in 1992, have been successful in indoctrinating the militants first into unincorporated Islamists and eventually in Jihadists. This process of indoctrination was possible because FIRGs effectively arranged and built Islamic ideological networks and Islamic infrastructural mechanisms that significantly facilitated the mobilization process to Syria's battlegrounds. Although this reality of Balkan militants joining Islamic radical groups linked to al-Qaeda (inside Syria) is affecting the region at both domestic and international levels, the prospect of these militants in the Balkans is bleak. In sum, Balkan militants will be confronted with a massive modern and democratic resistance that offers them nothing but reintegration into Balkan Islam, their natural "religious nest." 
